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Article 5

NOTES
COMMUNITY ANTENNA TELEVISION:

REACTION OF THE INDUSTRY

Although today few homes in the cities are without television sets, television
reception is still unavailable to many homes in the isolated rural areas of the
United States. Rugged topography of the continent and limited broadcast range
account for this situation. Neither problem, however, has proved insurmountable.
One system devised to broaden coverage is the community antenna (CATV). 1
A community antenna is a large antenna set on high ground within the broadcast range of one or more television stations. The antenna is designed to pick up
the signals of network or of local stations and to relay them either directly or
indirectly into the homes of the locale. Relay may be accomplished either by use of
a master cable running from the antenna to the homes, or, where relay is over a
greater distance, by use of microwave facilities to the master cable and then to the
subscribing homes. In the course of distribution, signals in some instances are
than those on which they have been
converted to different channels and frequencies
2
transmitted by the originating station.
Usually the CATV pays nothing to the originating station for use of the signals.
In most cases, the CATV charges its subscribers for services rendered in relaying the
signal.3 This practice gives rise to the legal questions discussed in the body of this
note.4 Stated broadly the question is this: Can a CATV appropriate and sell a
television station's broadcast signal without obtaining that station's consent, and
without paying compensation? Implicit in this problem are four more probing
questions: (1) Can the television industry protect its programs by statutory copyright? (2) Can the industry protect its programs by resort to common law copyright? (3) Are there other common law remedies available in the state courts?
(4) What effect has the Federal Communications Act upon all judicial remedies
in this area?
I. Protection by Statutory Copyright
In general, the protection of television programs by statutory copyright is less
than complete. The federal constitution gives Congress power ".... To promote
the Progress of Sciences and useful Arts, by securing for Limited Times to Authors
. . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings..

.

.

,,5Construing the con-

stitutional grant broadly, Congress exercised its power to fashion a copyright law
to protect the works of authors in Title 17 of the United States Code. The statute
protects both authors and proprietors of some thirteen distinct classes of "Writings." 6 Statutory copyrights can be obtained on some specified classes of works
not reproduced for sale and on thirteen classes of published works.
Published works are copyrighted by publication of the work with the specified
statutory notice affixed. 7 The statute gives the owner of the copyright the exclusive
right to "print, reprint, publish, copy and vend" the copyrighted work." Where

the work is unpublished and not reproduced for sale, a copyright can be obtained
which protects the work until publication. Lectures, dramatic, musical and
dramatico-musical compositions, photographs, and photoplays can be copyrighted
I FCC,
TORS,

TV

INQUIRY INTO THE IMPACT OF COMMUNITY ANTENNA SYSTEMS, TV TRANSLA"SATELLITE" STATIONS, AND TV "REPEATERS" ON THE ORDERLY DEVELOPMENT

or TELEVISION BROADCASTING, 26 F.C.C. 403 (1959).
2 See generally Doerfer, Community Antenna Teleu sion Systems, 14 FED. COM. B.J.

(1954).

3 Time, Nov., 13, 1964, p. 110.
4 See generally Wall Street Journal, Dec. 15, 1964, p. 1, col. 1.
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
6 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1958).
7 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1958).
8 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
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as nonpublished works not reproduced for sale.9 This copyright is obtained by
deposit of copies with a claim of copyright. The act protects the author or
proprietor of the work, or his assignee. 10 Therefore, where the industry itself
through its employees has created the program, or where it has obtained an assignment from the independent creator, the industry could sue an infringing CATV2
on its own behalf.:" On the other hand, a licensee cannot sue in his own name.1
However, he may compel suit by his licensor against an infringer.' 3 Thus, since a
great many television programs would fall within one of the statutory classes, the
statute would seem to give at least partial protection. Practically, however, statutory
protection of "expression"' 14 as it is found embodied within one of the thirteen
classes, is inadequate for the purposes of the television industry. In the case of
published works, the strict requirements of the statute as to "notice" and "deposit"
prevent copyrighting of numerous programs.' 5 Copies of "live" programs8 cannot be deposited. Moreover, certain programs such as news and sports broadcasts
do not fit within any one of the statutory classes. In the case of works unpublished
and not reproduced for sale, the problems are similar. Here again protection is
too narrow. Many programs, such as "live" broadcasts would fall outside the protected classes. Further, reproduction for sale would end all protection under section 12.17 Where, for example, a network would make copies of a travelogue, upon
sale the works would no longer be protected under section 12. Finally, since protection for nonpublished works ends upon publication, and since it seems reasonable that national broadcasts should amount to publications, protection is probably
illusory, even though the majority of courts to date have held broadcasting to be
mere "performance" or "limited publication."' s Cognizant of these problems, the
television industry has relied on the traditional remedies of common law copyright
and unfair competition. In the event that these remedies should prove unavailable,
the statutory forms will no doubt be used to the extent of their worth.
A performer who is not an author cannot protect his creations or renditions
by use of statutory copyright. In spite of the "novelty of his rendition," the statute
grants no protection to a mere performer, such as a singer, newscaster, or athlete.,
9

17 U.S:C. § 12 (1958).

10 17 U.S.C. § 9 (Supp. V, 1964). See generally Note, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 161
(1964).
11 17 U.S.C. § 9 Supp. V, 1964; 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1958), "[mFhe word 'author' shall
include an employer in the case of works made for hire."
12 Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v. Howells Sales Co., 282 Fed. 9, 11 (2nd Cir., cert. denied,
262 U.S. 755 (1922).

13

SPRING, RISKS AND RIGHTS IN PUBLISHING TELEvIsIoN, RADIO, MOTION PICTURES,

THEATER 168 (2nd ed. 1956) elaborates:
"The licensee is only the equitable owner of the rights in the bundle licensed
to him. A licensee therefore cannot sue an infringer in his own name for
infringement of rights he holds as licensee. If the licensor refuses to sue
to protect the licensee, the licensee can make his licensor a party defendant,
together with the infringer, and thus force the licensor to sue."
14 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1953).
15 37 C.F.R. § 202.2 (1949). Where works are in fact published, and where notice
has been affixed as required, if the work is within one of the protected classes, then the
work is protected from infringement even though there has been no deposit. No action,
however, can be brought for infringement prior to deposit. Washingtonian Publishing Co. v.
Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1938).
16 Throughout this note, the intended meaning of "live" broadcast is not only unfilmed,
but spontaneous. Consequently, a "live" broadcast based on a script should not be included within the term. The author would describe an in-progress, simultaneously televised
baseball game as a "live" broadcast.
17 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1958). See text accompanying note 9 supra.
18 See, e.g., Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (1937).
See discussion in text accompanying notes 70-74 infra.
19 Id. at 437-38, 194 Ad. at 633. The Court said: "The creator of such a work must
protect his property rights therein, but the statute does not recognize any right of a performing
artist in his interpretative rendition of a musical composition, or in the acting of a play,
composed by another." The applicant had tried to copyright his rendition but the Register
ADVERTISING, AND THE

NOTES
II.

Protection by Common Law Copyright

According to a number of state court decisions, it seems that common law
copyright could be used by the television industry to protect its programs from
appropriation. Two recent Federal Supreme Court20 decisions, however, raise questions as to the propriety of this use of the remedy.
Common law copyright is a traditional judicial remedy. It was designed to
protect the expression of a creator as his expression was embodied prior to
publication. 21 The Supreme Court of Illinois has described common law copyright:
At common law the author of a literary composition had an absolute
property right in his production which he could not be deprived of so
long as it remained unpublished, nor could he be compelled to publish
it. This right of property exists at common law in all productions of
literature, the drama, music, art, etc., and the author may permit the
use of his production by one or more persons to the exclusion of all others,
and may give a copy of his manuscript to another person without parting
with his property in it... . Upon the publication of the production the
author's common-law22 right ceased, and it became public property unless
protected by statute.

In the United States the common law copyright remedy is preserved by
statute:
Nothing in this title [copyright act] shall be construed to annul or limit
the right of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common
law or in equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such
unpublished work without his consent, and to obtain damages therefor.23
The section24 creates no new federal right, but leaves an author a remedy for infringement.

State courts have given surprisingly broad protection by means of this common
law action.25 They have not felt themselves bound by the thirteen statutory
classes.28 Consequently, many works clearly not writings have been protected.
In

2
Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Co. 7 an orchestra's musical rendition was

held to be secured by common law copyright exclusively to the orchestra's leader
as an artistic work.
[In contributing] by his interpretation something of novel intellectual
artistic value, . . . [Waring] has undoubtedly participated in the creation
of a product in which he is entitled to a right of property, which in no
way overlaps or duplicates that of the author of the musical composition.
29
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., has gone
even further in holding that a television broadcaster's "voice and style of talking" were
30
protected as his property by common law copyright.
forms of "art expression"
of Copyrights said: "There is not and never has been any provision in the Act for the
protection of an artist's personal interpretation or rendition of a musical work not expressible
by musical notation in the form of 'legible' copies although the subject has been extensively
discussed both here and abroad." Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, supra at 438, 194
At. at 633-34, n.2.
20 Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
21 Warner, Protection of the Content of Radio and Television Programs by Common
Law Copyright, 3 VAND. L. REv. 209 (1949); SPRING, RisKs AND RIGHTS IN PUBLISMNG
TELEVISION, RADIo, MoTIoN PICTURES, ADVERTISING, AND THE THEATER § 42 (2d ed. 1956).
22 Frohman v. Ferris, 238 Ill. 430, 435-36, 87 N.E. 327, 328 (1909), aff'd, 223 U.S. 424
(1912).
23 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
24 See Edgar H. Wood Associates, Inc. v. Skene, 197 N.E.2d 886, 890 (Mass. 1964).
25 Warner, Protection of the Content of Radio and Television Programs by Common Law
Copyright, 3 VAND. L. Rv. 209, 211-13 (1949). See text accompanying notes 15-39 supra,
for illustration of common law copyright coverage.
26 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1958).
27 327 Pa. 433, 194 AUt. 631 (1937).
28 Id. at 441, 194 AUt. at 635.
29 42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
30 Id. at 725, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 811.
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Assuming that these holdings are correct, common law copyright has extremely
broad coverage. 31
Besides protecting "works" or "writings" outside the statutory classes, the
state courts have also given "authors" a more inclusive meaning. Thus in Waring
and in Documentaries Unv. WDAS 32 a band leader was held to be an "author,"
33
limited an announcer was held to be an author.
Common law copyright can exist only in an "unpublished" work.3 4 If there
is to be protection after "publication," the requirements set out in the statute must
be met.3 5

Failure to comply results in a dedication of the work to the public;

it puts the work in the public domain.
"Publication" is a complex fact. It includes both objective and subjective
elements. Pennsylvania's Supreme Court makes this clear:
"In determining whether or not there has been such a publication, the courts
look partly to the objective character of the dissemination and partly to the
3
proprietor's intent in regard to the relinquishment of his property rights."
to
whether
as
decisions
The state courts have rendered numerous and conflicting
given facts will amount to publication. Both state and federal courts have defined
without considering that the fact of "publication" might be a federal
publication
7
question.3

In Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co.38 the plaintiffs sued for damages
for interference with a second licensing agreement for use of an already broadcast
script. The defendants, the first licensee had combined to prevent the later use of
a script on the grounds that the second licensee would cause diminution of the
value of their license. The court prohibited the second licensing because such action
would be in derogation of the rights of the prior licensee. The trial court took
the position that broadcasting did not amount to "publication" and the appellate
court impliedly agreed. Similarly, in Metropolitan Opera Ass'n Inc. v. WagnerNichols Recorder Corp.,3 9 where the issue was the presence or absence of unfair
competition, a New York appellate court held that broadcasting was not "publication," and consequently enjoined the defendant from recording the Metropolitan
Opera's radio broadcasts for subsequent sale. Along the same lines, quite recently
in Documentaries Unlimited" a New York appellate court held that television news
broadcasts were not publications so as to render the announcer's "voice and style"
subject to appropriation for use on defendant's phonograph records.
The question of whether broadcasting amounts to "publication," however, may
31

17 U.S.C. § 2 (1958)

makes express provision for common law copyright as a state

court remedy. This section is a carryover from the act of 1909. The intent of the provision

seems to be to preserve the remedy as it had been known. Up until that time the remedy
had been invoked only to protect an author's expression as it was found embodied either in

a writing or other work of art. Whether state courts can now protect "expression" of an
author not so embodied is open to question. See text accompanying notes 41-53 infra.

32 Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433, 194 Ad. 631 (1937).
33 Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d
723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964). See Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E.D.N.C.
1939) ; a garbled opinion which protected the rights of a performing artist; the case was
subsequently overruled by the state legislature.
34 Shaniro. Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. Miracle Record Co., 91 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ill.
1950); 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
35 17 U.S.C. §§ 10, 13 (1958).
36 Waring v.WDAS Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 443, 444, 194 Ad. 631, 636 (1937).
37 E.q., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955)
(followed law of New York).
38 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1934), modified, 81 F.2d 373 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 298
U.S. 670 (1936).
39 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950); aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107
N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
40 Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d
723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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not be finally settled.4 It seems that "publication" might be a federal question
rather than a matter for the determination of the courts of the several states. The
fact of "publication" pervades the entire copyright law. It is crucial in cases of
statutory as well as in cases of common law copyright. Aware of this problem,
the Court in G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler said: "even though the state law
held that publication was not a dedication we feel bound to disregard it, be4 2
cause the question would still be, not one of state law, but of federal law."

The federal copyright statute grants protection only where there is "publication." Therefore, the Court concluded that "publication" is a federal question.
The decision further merits special notice because the Supreme4 3 Court has recently
approved Haendler in Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Stiffel Co. Beyond this, the
decision is of importance because no federal court accepting the Haendler doctrine
has determined whether broadcasting amounts to publication. It seems reasonable
to call a nation-wide network broadcast a "publication" rather than a "limited
publication" or mere "performance." It is possible that such a dissemination would
it took place with the intention of rendering such work
"justify the belief that
44
common property."
Nevertheless, in view of the state holdings on the meaning of "author" and
"work," if not "publication," it seems that state courts will protect television
broadcasts by way of common law copyright. Indeed, this is precisely what was
done in Columbia Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc.4 A
fortiori, if protection can be given in such a case, all television programs must be
protectable. If a newscaster has protectable rights in his voice and style, certainly
sports announcers must have similar rights. By assignment, the stations themselves
could have these rights.
The above stated principles of state law, however, should not be regarded
as conclusive. In view of two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
by way of
States, it would seem that the states in granting such broad protection
common law copyright have overstepped the bounds of authority. 48 It appears
that the states are not free to enlarge substantially the coverage of their remedy
beyond its historical scope. Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Stiffel Co.,4 while speaking

in terms of unfair competition, clearly applies:

Just as a State cannot encroach upon the federal patent [and copyright]
laws directly, it cannot, under some other law... give protection of a kind
that clashes with the objectives of the federal patent [and copyright] laws.
...To allow a State by the use of its laws of unfair competition to prevent
the copying of an article which represents too slight an advance to be
the public somepatented would be to permit the State to block off from
8
the public. 4
thing which federal law has said belongs to
9
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,4 a case decided the same day, is in

accord. Neither Sears nor Compco by any means voids section 2. They must be
read, however, as limiting state remedies to their traditional boundaries; copyright
41 See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664 (2d Cir.
1955) (dissenting opinion).
42 194 F.2d 914, 915 (2d Cir. 1952).
43 376 U.S. 225, 233 (1964).
44 American Tobacco Co. v. Wreckmelster, 207 U.S. 284, 300 (1907).
45 42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
46 In Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 n.7 (1964) the Court
indicates the pre-emptive effect of federal law:
The purpose of Congress to have national uniformity in patent and copyright laws can be inferred from such statutes as that which vests exclusive
jurisdiction to hear patent and copyright cases in the federal courts . . .
and that section of the Copyright Act which expressly saves state protection
of unpublished writings but does not include published writings, 17 U.S.C.

§ 2.

47 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
48 Id. at 231-32.
49 376 U.S. 334 (1964).
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must only be used to protect the expression of an author, artist, etc., as it is found
embodied. Consequently, it would seem that, as in the case of the statutory
copyright, "live" broadcasts would be without protection. A recent Massachusetts
Supreme Court holding lends weight to this argument. In Edgar H. Wood Associates, Inc. v. Skene, the court said:
A careful reading of these two opinions does not convince us that they have
struck down common law copyright, which protects unpublished material.
...The Copyright Act .. .expressly saves state protection of unpublished
writings but does not include published writings.... 5

On the other hand, common law copyright would certainly cover those television programs based on scripts. Nor is there much doubt that the CATV's relay
to subscribers would amount to infringement of the copyright. A performance for
profits without the consent of the copyright proprietor constitutes an -infringement.51
Moreover, the actions of a CATV are quite similar to the activities proscribed in
Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co. 2 There the owner of a hotel relayed radio
broadcasts which he had received by use of his own radio to the rooms of his
guests throughout the hotel. Since he did this to make his hotel more desirable
and thereby increase business and profits, the piping of sound
3 to the rooms was
a "performance for profit." The decision has been followed.
III.

Protection from Unfair Competition

The third question concerns the extent to which state laws against unfair
competition can be invoked by the television industry to protect its programs.
Although state courts have granted wider protection against unfair competition
than against copyright infringement, Sears54 and Compco55 seem to indicate that
the states have gone too far.
The basis of all state court decisions in this area is the Supreme Court's holding
in International News Service v. Associated Press."6 There the court held, over
dissent by Mr. Justice Brandies, that the Associated Press had a "quasi-property
right" in "news" which it had gathered, 57 and that appropriation of the news by
INS, a competitor, would constitute unfair competition, until such time as the
news had lost its commercial value. The majority said that appropriation alone
was sufficient ground for relief; "palming-off" (sale of an appropriated product as
one's own) was no longer requisite to a showing of unfair competition.58 Copyright considerations were irrelevant.59 Throughout the opinion, the Court made it
clear that the competitors - as opposed to the general public - were limited in
their activities by considerations of fairness.0 0 The state courts in a number of
somewhat similar situations have relied upon this holding to reach what they
have perceived to be "equitable" results."'
After the INS decision, a New York Court in Twentieth Century Sporting
Club, Inc. v. Trans-Radio Press Service 2 enjoined defendants from rebroadcasting
by way of paraphrase the plaintiff's blow-by-blow description of a prize fight, citing
50 197 N.E.2d 887, 890 (Mass. 1964).
51 See 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
52 283 U.S. 191, 197 (1931).
53 See, e.g., Society of European S.A.A.C. v. New York Hotel Statler Co., 19 F. Supp. 1
(S.D.N.Y. 1937).
54 Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
55 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
56 248 U.S. 215 (1918). Hereinafter referred to in text as INS.
57 Id. at 236.
58 Id. at 241-42.
59 Id. at 234-35.
60 Id. at 239-40.
61 E.g., Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786,
796, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 492 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795

(1951).
62

165 Misc. 71, 300 N.Y. Supp. 159 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
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INS. In the same year, in Waring v. WDAS BroadcastingStation6 s the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court forbade a radio station from rebroadcasting music from records
made by RCA Victor which bore a restrictive legend stating that the record was
not sold for broadcast purposes. The Court found the radio station to be Waring's
competitor, and held the use of the records to be enjoinable misappropriation
under the state's law against unfair competition. The Court relied heavily on INS.
A similar result was reached in New York in Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v.
Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp.6" The Metropolitan Opera had granted broadcast
rights in its performances to the Columbia Broadcasting System. The defendants
attempted to record these broadcasts on phonograph records and to sell them. The
Court, citing INS,95 issued a restraining order and found that the Metropolitan
Opera had property rights in its productions which the defendant was seeking to
pirate. In granting its relief without requiring actual competition, the Court extended INS.66
The result reached in these cases seems fair: protection for the creator and
his work. The simple underlying premise in each of the progeny of INS is that
the creator retains an interest in his work,67 which the courts can secure to him
by granting him a "limited property right," which will be safeguarded against
competitor appropriation. Further, in every instance, it has been incumbent upon
the complainant to show that there has been less than total dedication to the
public: that is, that the creator, in spite of all that was done, still retains an
interest in the product at least as against an entrepreneur seeking to enrich himself
by use of the work.6 8 Thus in Waring, the Court seized upon the contract granting
RCA Victor exclusive recording rights to establish a protectable interest,6 9 and
in Metropolitan Opera the Court looked to the restrictive legend which forbade
the use of the records for broadcast purposes to establish retention of the protectable
interest.70 A recent New York case, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Documentaries Unlimited, Inc.,71 has gone even further. In that case a news-

caster's voice and style were protected against a recording company's misappropriation and use as a one-minute part of a forty-eight minute record. The retention of
63 327 Pa. 433, 194 At. 631 (1937).
64 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107
N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
65 Besides relying on INS, the court also relied on Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV
Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938). There, the courts sustained the exclusive right of the plaintiff to control the broadcasting of descriptions of the baseball games
played in the plaintiffs park by the plaintiff's team. The court enjoined the defendants
from broadcasting the play-by-play description. Defendants had tried to broadcast from a
perch on a rooftop just outside the park.
66 Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101
N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
67 See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 240-41 (1918);
Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433, 453, 194 Atl. 631, 640 (1937);
Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 798-99, 101
N.Y.S.2d 483, 494-95 (1950).
68 Contra, Intermountain Broadcasting and Television Corp. v. Idaho Microwave, Inc.,
196 F. Supp. 315 (D. Idaho 1961). A CATV plainned to appropriate the signals of a local
telecaster. The telecaster sought an injunction which was denied. The court found no
protectable interest, absent reliance on the copyright law, or reliance upon an exclusive
licensing agreement between the network station and the local stations. The court also
found that 47 U.S.C. § 325(a), discussed infra, gave the local station no protection.
See, National Exhibition Co. v. Teleflash, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1936); comment,
61 CoLum. L. Rav. 1524 (1964); comment, 23 MD.L. Rpm. 365 (1961).
69 Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433, 453, 194 Atl. 631, 640
(1937). "In line with the theory of the Associated Press Case, the 'publication' of the
orchestra's rendition was a dedication of them only to purchasers for use of the records
on phonographs, and not to competive interests to profit therefrom at plaintiff's expense."
70 Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 798-99,
101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 494 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
71 42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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interest was found to result from his contract of employment with the station.
Here his broadcast was held to be something less than a complete dedication, thus
blocking the recording company. The Court reasoned that the defendant's use
made the recording company his competitor, and found unfair competition. We
may infer that the case extended the holding of INS.
In light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Sears and Compco, the decisions
since INS, protecting expression or performance from unfair competition, seem
questionable. Unfair competition cannot be used to protect every existing interest.
In the Sears case, the plaintiff had designed a pole-lamp and had secured
design patents for his product. The defendant, without mislabeling, copied the
poles exactly. Some customers were confused by the similarity. The plaintiff sued,
relying upon his patents and upon the law of unfair competition. The District
Court, although finding the patents invalid, found unfair competition and gave
equitable relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court, however,
reversed, holding:
[The patent laws], like other laws of the United States enacted pursuant
to constitutional authority, are the supreme law of the land....
Thus the patent system is one in which uniform federal standards
are carefully used to promote invention while at the same time preserving
free competition. Obviously a State could not, consistently with the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, extend the life of a patent beyond
its expiration date or give a patent on an article which lacked the level of
invention required upon federal patents.... Just as a State cannot encroach
upon the federal patent laws directly, it cannot, under some other law,
such as that forbidding unfair competition, give protection
of a kind that
72
clashes with the objectives of the federal patent laws.

Considering an analogous fact situation on the same day, the Court in Compco
elaborated on what it had said in Sears:
Today we have held in Sears . . . that when an article is unprotected
by a patent or a copyright, state law may not forbid others to copy that
article. To forbid copying would interfere with the federal policy . . . of
allowing free access
to copy whatever the federal patent laws leave in the
73
public domain.
The meaning of the cases is clear. Congress in enacting the patent law sought

to protect invention; in enacting the copyright law, it attempted to protect expression. It gave all the protection that it thought desirable, and pre-empted the
field.7 4 Repeated refusals by Congress to extend copyright protection further show
that Congress has intended no additional protection of expression.
Sears and Compco, although they seem incompatible with the progeny of INS,

do not seem irreconcilable with INS itself. In INS the Court was not allowing a
state to protect "expression" either directly or indirectly. Rather, it was allowing
the protection of "news" - something in the nature of a current asset.
[N]ews matter, however susceptible of ownership or dominion in the absolute
sense, is stock in trade, to be gathered at the cost of enterprise, organization, skill, labor, and money, and to be distributed and
sold to those who
will pay money for it, as for any other merchandise.75

This distinction, however, becomes blurred in the broadcast cases. In Metropolitan
Opera and in Waring it is not so clear.whether the rendition is an "asset" or an
72 Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 376 U.S. 225, 229-31 (1964).
73 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
74 See Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized, 335 F.2d 774, 780-81 (2d Cir. 1964); the
Second Circuit seems to have done exactly what the Supreme Court forbade in Sears.
The district court held the trademark, "Flexitized," invalid, because it was merely descriptive.
Yet it found that the defendant's use of the word amounted to unfair competition, in spite
of the fact that it could not find "palming-off" or "secondary meaning." The Second Circuit
treated the case as a mere diversity case, saying: "[T]he source of the right sued upon,
rather than the ground used to obtain federal jurisdiction, should determine the governing
law ....
[S]tate law ought to govern the result we reach."
75 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918).
(Emphasis added.)
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"expression." 76 In fact, the two seem to merge. This is also true in the television
area, in a case such as Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc. 77 There, operation of a
community antenna was typical. The shows appropriated were both the creations
or expressions of the producing station, and, at the same time, assets of the station.
It is true that the revenues of the stations are not obtained by selling the programs
to the public for cash; yet, the fact that they are salable is clearly illustrated by
their activities.a In the case of the CATV the sale is direct; in the case of the
television station, the sale is indirect in that the public supports the sponsor who
in turn pays the stations for its product. At the same time, however, the productions are "expressions." Consequently, under Sears and Compco, it would appear
that statutory and common law copyright must be the allowable extent of protection. Viewing the programs as "expressions" results in inadequate protection because of the application of federal pre-emption; "live" shows again would be without
protection."0 Therefore, the question presented is this: Is that protected essentially
an "asset" or an "expression"? If substantially the latter Sears and Compco
supply the relevant precedent. If the former, INS should govern.
In Cable Vision the Ninth Circuit faced this very problem. The CATV was
appropriating the signals of the station and relaying it for profit to its subscribers.
The Court, pointing out that INS had been limited by the Second Circuit80 to its
facts, distinguished the case on the grounds that the station and the CATV were
not competitors, and also, by pointing to some "palming-off" in INS. The Court
followed Brandies' dissent in INS and referred to his remarks: "The general rule
of law is, that the noblest productions - knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas - become after voluntary communication to others, free as
air to the common use."'11 The Court treated the programs only as "expressions."
If this is correct, so was its reliance on Sears and Cornpco. But if the programs are
more in the nature of "assets," then the decision should be reversed, for Sears and
Compco would have no application, and INS should govern.
In treating INS as an anomolous decision rather than distinguishing legal
principles involved, the Court forced itself to make two questionable factual distinctions. The fact that the station derives revenues from sponsors while the
CATV derives its income from subscribers does not seem to preclude a finding of
competition for reasons discussed above. The economic realities of the situation
indicate competition. Both want the same viewers.8 2 Further, the pilming-off distinction is unpersuasive, for in INS that Court indicated that "palming-off" was
neither present nor essential. More important, however, INS has never been limited
to its facts by the Supreme Court, and it has been liberally applied by many other
courts."
76 It is difficult to categorize a "song" or a "musical rendition" as stock in trade. On the
other hand, a television program seems to be in the nature of an asset.
77 Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964); comment, 31
GEo. WAsir. L. Rxv. 868 (1963).
78 Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., supra note 77.
79 "Live" shows as the term is used here means those shows which are spontaneous;
that is shows without scripts.
80 RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
712 (1940). Here again an orchestra leader sought to limit the use of his renditions. As in
Waring the records bore a restrictive legend which proscribed broadcasting. Hand, J., however, limited INS to its facts, and cited Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279,
(2d Cir. 1929).
81 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (dissenting
opinion).
82 The sponsors want their advertising to reach the homes in the locale. If the CATV
cut into the audiences of the broadcasting stations, the advertising by way of the local station
reaches fewer homes.

The station has a more difficult time selling its programs to the

sponsor, and consequently its revenues drop. The network stations can also be hurt. They
sell their programs to the local stations. If the local stations fail, the networks lose
customers.
83 See Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Stati6n, 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl.. 631 (1937);
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It would seem, therefore, that television programs are more in the nature of
stock in trade. If this is the case, then the state courts should be open to protect the
industry against the CATV.
IV. Federal Communications Commission Complications
The Federal Communications Commission originally said that it had no power
to regulate CATV operation. Where the CATV merely receives the broadcast
signal and relays itdirectly by cable to its subscribers, the FCC has yet to regulate.
Where, however, the CATV receives the signal and relays it by microwave carrier
to the point of dissemination, the Commission has reversed its original stand and
has regulated. This section of the note will discuss grounds for FCC regulation of
the CATV industry, and, where grounds exist, the effect of such regulation upon
the courts in cases of copyright infringement and unfair competition.
A.

Grounds for Regulation

In general, Congress has vested the FCC with power to regulate broadcasting 4
and common carriers8 5 Subchapter III of the Federal Communications Act contains provisions relating to broadcasting. Subchapter II of the act deals with common carriers. Both provisions seem to give the FCC power to regulate the CATV
industry. The FCC, however, has said that they did not.86
87
Under title III of the act, the Commission has power to license radio facilities'88
pursuant to standards of the "public interest, convenience and necessity."
These facilities may be either private broadcasting stations or common carrier broadcast facilities. "Broadcasting" is defined as "dissemination of radio communications
intended to be received by the public, directly or by the intermediary of relay stations."8' 9 "Radio Communication" is defined as the "transmission by radio of ...
pictures, and sounds ...."80 Included in the phrase "transmission by radio" are
transmissions by instrumentalities "incidental" to radio operation which serve to
receive, forward and deliver the communications. 91 The 7th Circuit Court has said
that television is one form of broadcasting. 92 The CATV disseminates "communications ...intended to be recived by the public" and they transmit "pictures and
sounds."

Further, they "receive, forward and deliver . . . communications."

A

literal reading of the statute would thus seem to put them under the FCC's control.
The FCC, however, after a special study, determined that it could not control the CATV by use of its Subchapter III powers.9 3 The Commission reached its
conclusion by looking to the underlying purpose of the subchapter as it is found
set out in section 301 of the act.94 The Commission said that Congress gave it
Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 279 App. Div. 632, 107
N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Documentaries, Unlimited, Inc.,
42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964); many other cases also.
84 Federal Communications Act § 301-29, 48 Stat. 1081 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§ 301-29 (1958), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 303-30 (Supp. V 1964).
85 48 Stat. 1070 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-22 (1958), as amended, 47
U.S.C. §§ 202, 219 (Supp.V 1964).
86
TORS,

FCC, INQUIRY INTO THE IMPACT OF
TV "SATELLITE" STATIONS, AND TV

COMMUNITY ANTENNA SYSTEMS, TV TRANsLA'REPEATERS" ON THE ORDERLY DEVELOPMENT

OF TELEVISION BROADCASTING, 26 F.C.C. 403 (1959). Hereinafter cited as "INQUIRY.-"
87 48 STAT. 1083 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1958), as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§ 307(d) (Supp. V 1964).
88 48 STAT. 1075 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (Supp. V 1964).
89 48 Stat. 1065 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 153(o) (1958).
90 48 Stat. 1065 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1958).
91 48 Stat. 1065 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1958).
92 Allen B. Dumont v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153, 155 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
929 (1950).
93 "INQUIRY," 26 F.C.C. 403 (1959).
94 48 Stat. 1081 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1958).
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power only to order use of the broadcastways, and not to regulate communications in
general. The CATV uses only cables, not airways, to transmit its signals. 'The
legislative history of the act would appear to support the Commission's determination. 5
Other arguments can be made in favor of a finding of no jurisdiction. The
CATV does in fact "receive, forward, and deliver ..

.

communications."

In

doing so, however, they are not "facilities incidental to radio [or television] operation." They are systems separate unto themselves.
Finally, there is quite a distinct reason why the FCC should have no power
under title III to regulate the CATV industry. The FCC has been created to
deal with problems of national concern. 98 In many instances, however, the operation of the CATV is essentially local, and will interfere with no one. This commonly occurs where the CATV relays to subscribers beyond the broadcast range
of all television stations; here the activities should be beyond the power of the FCC.
A second ground suggested for FCC control is that the CATV is a common
carrier, which the act defines as "any person . . . engaged . .. in interstate . . .
communication by wire or radio. . ; ." 9 "Communication by wire" is defined
as "transmission of . . . pictures, and sounds . . . by aid of wire or cable . . .
between the points of origin and reception of such transmission. . .. " 9s Con-

sequently, from an examination of these subsections it would appear that the
CATVs might be carriers subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. On the other
hand, section 152(b), which explains the coverage of the act, tends to negate a
finding of jurisdiction. This section provides (subject to the provisions in subchapter III) that "nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply or to give
the Commission jurisdiction with respect to . . . any carrier engaged in interstate

communication . .. with the facilities of another carrier.99
In Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier'"0 and in a special study on the
CATV question, 101 the Commission made its ruling by looking to the nature of
carrier operations. In Frontier the subscriber rather than the carrier chose the
matter to be transmitted. The Commission held that it had no jurisdiction to regulate
the subscriber as a carrier, pointing out that a common carrier does not choose
the intelligence to be transmitted. Moreover, the Commission could not regulate
the subscriber by regulating the subject matter that the carrier might transmit
1 2
because this would be censorship which is expressly prohibited by the act.'

Since the CATV similarly chooses what is to be transmitted, it cannot be regulated
as a carrier.
A third proposed ground for FCC regulation has been found in section
325 (a) of the act. The section provides that no "broadcasting station [shall]
rebroadcast the program or any part thereof of another broadcasting station without
the express authority of the originating station"' The proponents of regulatidh
contend that since CATV operation is similar to a rebroadcasting station, it should
be governed by the section. The legislative history of the section, however, justifies
the contrary conclusion of the Commission.' 4
95 FCC v.Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940).: "The fundamental
purpose of Congress in respect of broadcasting was the allocation and regulation of the
use of radio frequencies by prohibiting such use except under license."
96 See FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940). "By this Act
Congress, in order to protect the national interest involved in the new and far-reaching
science of broadcasting, formulated a unified and comprehensive regulatory system for the
industry."
97 48 Stat. 1065 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1958).
98 48 Stat. 1065 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1958).
99 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1958).
100 Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958).
101 "INQurmy," 26 F.C.C. 403 (1959).
102 48 Stat 1091 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1958).
103 48 Stat 1091 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 325(a) (1958).
104 "Inquiry," 26 F.C.C. 403, 429-30 (1959).
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It has also been contended that in enacting section 325(a) Congress meant
to confer property rights upon the broadcasting stations in their broadcasts. 05
The Commission, however, has rejected this argument, interpreting the provision
only to allow protection of rights where they have been already held by the courts
to exist. In doing so, the Commission stated that it is not the proper forum for
the adjudication of the existence or non-existence of private property rights. 08
A fourth ground urged for the exercise of FCC power lies in the FCC's
"plenary power" over communications. The Commission has a duty to encourage
the use of radio, make regulations applicable to broadcasting, and generally make
inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry
such rules and regulations, not
0 7
out the act and its purposes.

The FCC, however, originally disclaimed "plenary power"; the Commission
said it did not have power to regulate "any and all enterprises which happen to be
connected with one of the many aspects of communications."' ' 08 The Commission,
however, expressly left the door open where the "connected enterprise" would
have a "substantial adverse impact" on local stations and upon the public interest. 0 9
Since that time, such a case has risen, and the Commission has exercised "plenary
power."
In Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v.FCC10 a common carrier applied
for a permit to install microwave relay facilities. The Commission found that the
facilities would be used by a GATV, that improvement of the CATV facilities
would probably drive the local broadcasting station out of business, and that this
would be contrary to the public interest. It therefore denied the permit by an
exercise of its "plenary power." It refused to apply the statutory common carrier
standards of "public convenience and necessity," but instead looked to the "public
interest" (the standard used in licensing broadcasting stations) :
Carter [the carrier] contends that because we have no jurisdiction over

the customer, we cannot consider the activities of the customer in regulating

the carrier. We do not agree. If making the grant enables this customer
... to destroy a basic Commission policy . . .the ability to create such a
situation in this particular instance is sufficient to warrant an examination
into the entire problem.... We will not permit a subsequent grant to be
issued if it be demonstrated that the same would vitiate a prior grant,
without weighing the public-interest considerations involved."'
Examining the case in this manner, the Commission found that economic injury
to the television stations would be against the public interest. Although the FCC

has yet to go so far, under this rationale regulation of all CATVs which affect local
television broadcasting seems possible.
Since the affirmance of Carter Mountain by the Court of Appeals, the FCC
has embarked upon a program of regulation of CATVs by regulation of their
microwave suppliers. In doing so, the Commission has said it is to promulgate
regulations which will- give adequate protection to the local television service
2
without inhibiting the growth of the community antenna service."1 To implement
this purpose, the FCC in December of 1963 gave notice of the following proposed
rules: (1) that the CATV systems should carry the programs of the local stations,
and (2) that there should be no duplication of the local programs within the
primary contours for 15 days." 3
105 Id. at 434.
106 Id. at 430.
107 48 STAT. 1081 (1934), 47 U.S.C. 303 (1958), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1), (s)
(Supp. V 1964).
108 "INQuxaY," 26 F.C.C. 403, 429 (1959).
109 Id. at 431.
110 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962), aff'd 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951

(1963).
III
112
113

Id. at 461-62. (Emphasis added.) Comment, 13 AM. U. L. Rav. 98 (1963).
F.C.C. Docket No. 14895 (Dec. 13, 1963); F.C.C. Docket No. 15233 (Dec. 13, 1963).
Ibid.
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B. Effect of Jurisdiction
Even assuming, however, that the Commission might have complete jurisdiction over the licensing of the CATVs, it does not follow that pre-emption should
occur in every instance involving broadcasting. Although it has been said that the
Federal Communications Act provides a comprehensive plan for the regulation of
the broadcasting industry, it is clear that the FCA was not intended to do away
with common law remedies where questions of private rights are at stake. The
Commission has itself said that it is not the proper forum for the adjudication
of property rights." 4 The FCA is concerned only with regulating the broadcasting
industry so as to provide for the "public interest" ;l5 it is not concerned with
adjudication of rights between individuals, :- 6 even though they may happen to be
individuals whose primary activities are broadcasting. On this basis, the courts
of Nebraska had jurisdiction to determine questions of property law and fraud,
even though a judgment would necessarily involve the determination of ownership
of a broadcast license."17 The courts retained this jurisdiction even though the
Commission admittedly had exclusive power to grant radio licenses.
V.

Conclusion

At least in some instances, the television broadcasting industry desires protection for its programs from unauthorized and uncompensated use by the CATVs.
The industry has gone to the courts, the FCC and to Congress. In the courts, the
industry has sought relief by claiming infringement of common law copyright and
unfair competition, relying on precedent supplied by analogous radio cases. In
Cable Vision the Ninth Circuit refused to invoke either remedy to protect the
industry. But television programs are arguably like stock in trade. Cable Vision,
therefore, seems incorrectly decided and the Supreme Court, having granted certiorari, should reverse relying on INS as precedent. Unauthorized and uncompensated use of another's stock and trade is unfair competition. Common law
copyright may also be available to protect some programs - those analogous to
works that would have been protected at common law. The remedy must be confined within its traditional boundaries by the pre-emption of federal law. The
decisions which have gone further seem incompatible with Sears and Compco.
Statutory copyright, like common law copyright, affords only partial protection.
The industry has also sought relief from the FCC. Originally the FCC said
that it had no jurisdiction over the CATVs. More recently, however, the Commission has found that it can regulate the CATVs where their operations jeopardize
the Commission's plans for providing local programifng, and where the destructive
effect upon local stations would be harmful to the public interest. The Commission's determination seems correct in light of the Commission's mandate - to
order the broadcasting industry. Absent Congressional intervention, the Commission
can be expected to extend its regulation to all cases in which it feels the television
broadcasting industry and the public might be harmed by the competition of the
CATVs.
Finally, although bills to control the CATVs have until now been defeated
in Congress, legislative authorization for regulation seems imminent. Such authorization would seem appropriate in light of the foregoing analysis.
John Donald O'Shea
114 "INQumY'" 26 F.C.C. 403, 430 (1959).
115 FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio
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116 FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, supra note 115; Daly v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., 309 F.2d 83, 85-86 (7th Cir. 1962).
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